Question: Can I control the ability for a user to list objects?
Answer: Yes. The describe… privileges control the ability to list and describe objects. For example, if an account wishes to use the "listTables" action, it needs the describeAnyTable privilege or one of its parent privileges.
Question: Is the built-in admin account more powerful than server administrator accounts?
Answer: Yes. The admin account is unique. It is more powerful than an account with the manageAnyServer and manageTheSecurityOfAnyServer permissions because no other user can change the admin account's password or alter its permissions. If you properly secure the admin account's password from malicious attackers, you can always use the admin account to undo their changes to permissions and passwords.
Question: Does a Manage privilege always have child privileges?
Answer: Yes.
Question: When I create an object, such as a table, do I have complete rights to manage the object?
Answer: Yes. When you create an object, the server automatically grants you the "manageOne…" permission for that object.
Question: When I create an object, do I own it?
Answer: No. The FairCom server does not have the concept of object ownership. The account that creates an object automatically gets the "manageOne…" permission for that object so that it has full authority over that object. Since many accounts may be assigned its "manageOne…" permission, they all have full authority over it.
Question: When I create an account, the server gives my account the "manageOneAccount" privilege for it. Since creating an account also creates the account's built-in role, do I also have the "manageOneRole" privilege for that account's built-in role?
Answer: No. A security administrator that creates an account does not automatically have the power to assign roles to that account because it violates the separation of duties required by the NIST standard. Thus, if a user creates an account, the user automatically receives the "manageOneAccount" privilege for that account but he does not receive any other privilege – he specifically does not receive the "manageOneRole" or "linkOneRoleWithAnyPrivilege" privileges for that account's built-in role. If you want an account to have the power to link privileges to a role, you must explicitly grant that authority to the account.
Question: When I permit the manageAnyTableInOneDatabase privilege and I shallow deny the manageOneTable privilege for the table named x, why doesn't it block access to that table?
Answer: A shallow deny blocks a user from receiving a manage privilege and neutralizes the permissions on the manage privilege’s descendants, but it does not block the manage privilege's descendants. The same role or other roles can permit one or more of these descendant privileges because they are not recursively denied. To deny a manage privilege and all its descendant privileges, recursively deny it.
Question: What happens when I permit the manageAnyServer privilege and I recursively deny the manageOneTable privilege on table x, does it block access to table x?
Answer: Yes. A recursive denial always overrides a permit. Thus, a recursive deny of manageOneTable on table x overrides a permit on manageAnyServer for table x. A recursive deny overrides a manage privilege and all its descendant privileges. Even if other roles permit one or more of the descendant privileges, the denial wins and prevents access.
For example, if you recursively deny the manageOneTable privilege on table x, an account with that setting cannot do anything with table x — even if that account has the powerful manageAnyServer permission.
Question: What happens when I permit the manageAnyServer privilege and I shallow deny the manageOneTable privilege on table x, does it block access to table x?
Answer: No, a shallow deny prevents an account from being an object manager and neutralizes the descendant permissions that come from being an object manager, but it doesn’t block roles from permitting descendant permissions. See below for more details.
A shallow deny overrides the manage permission and prevents an account from ever receiving that manage permission.
A shallow deny neutralizes the manage permission on its descendants. Thus, its descendant privileges are neither permitted nor denied. The same role or other roles can permit one or more of these descendant privileges because they are not recursively denied.
For example, if you shallow deny the manageOneTable privilege on table x, an account with that setting can never have permissions to manage table x, but you can still assign an account to have more specific permissions on table x, such as alterOneTable and readAnyRecordInOneTable.
Question: What happens when one role permits the manageOneTable privilege and another shallow denies the manageOneTable privilege on table x, does it block access to table x?
Answer: No, a shallow deny prevents an account from being an object manager and neutralizes the descendant permissions that come from being an object manager, but it doesn’t block roles from permitting descendant permissions. See below for more details.
A shallow deny overrides the manage permission and prevents an account from ever receiving that manage permission.
A shallow deny neutralizes the manage permission on its descendants. Thus, its descendant privileges are neither permitted nor denied. The same role or other roles can permit one or more of these descendant privileges because they are not recursively denied.
For example, if you shallow deny the manageOneTable privilege on table x, an account with that setting can never have permissions to manage table x, but you can still assign an account to have more specific permissions on table x, such as alterOneTable and readAnyRecordInOneTable.
Question: What happens when one role permits the manageOneTable privilege and another recursively denies the manageOneTable privilege on table x, does it block access to table x?
Answer: Yes, a recursive deny prevents an account from doing anything with the specified object — even if other roles give the account elevated permissions, such as manageAnyServer, manageAnyDatabase, or manageAnyTableInAnyDatabase.
Question: Does cloneRoles with clonePrivileges: true require linkOneRoleWithAnyPrivilege?
Answer: Cloning a role with clonePrivileges: true requires the createAnyRole, describeAnyRole, and linkAnyRoleWithAnyPrivilege privileges because the clone action assigns privileges to a role. Also the purpose of cloning a role is to create a new role that is identical to an existing role so you can modify its privileges.
Cloning a role with clonePrivileges: false requires the createAnyRole and describeAnyRole privileges because it is creating an empty role. This feature is redundant with createRole.
Question: Does configuring a topic onto an existing integration table require table privileges?
Answer: An account holding only createAnyMqTopic with no table privileges :
That account should be able to publish to any non-existent topic and the MQTT broker will create the topic and its underlying table. In other words, createAnyMqTopic privilege has the implicit permission createAnyTableInOneDatabase("faircom") and that database is the faircom database. If the account is denied the createAnyTableInOneDatabase("faircom") or the createAnyTableInAnyDatabase privilege, then that account cannot create any MQ Topics.
When that account uses configureTopic to change the table the topic uses, the account must have the manageAnyMqTopic, alterAnyMqTopic, alterOneMqTopic and it must have the insertAnyRecord... privilege for that table. Otherwise, we are creating a back door for accounts to use MQTT to write data to any integration table.
Question: Can I permit a user to read a specific subset of the SQL dictionary tables?
Answer: Yes. You can directly permit a user to read specific SQL dictionary tables using readAnyRecordInOneTable. In the rare exception that a non-DBA user needs to fix issues with a SQL dictionary table, you can give them manageAnyRecordInOneTable.
Question: Why should a power user have the ability to read the SQL dictionary tables?
Answer: This access is commonly given to power users to query the SQL dictionary tables to help them find tables and other database objects. Because the SQL dictionary tables expose all tables and objects, a user who can read them must also have permission to see all tables and objects in a database. That is why the ability to read SQL dictionary tables requires a database-level permission, such as describeOneDatabase.
Question: Why should an elevated user have the ability to manage SQL dictionary tables?
Answer: In the rare case the SQL dictionary tables have an issue caused by a bug, elevated users need to help FairCom Support to identify and fix the issue. To do so, elevated users need the ability to read, insert, update, and delete records in the SQL dictionary tables. They may also need to alter and rebuild SQL dictionary tables.
Question: Can an elevated user modify SQL dictionary tables to create accounts and grant permissions to other users?
Answer: No. The SQL dictionary tables do not manage accounts, roles, and permissions. This is handled in the separate, server-wide Security dictionary, which can only be accessed directly by the admin account. An authorized account must use the JSON action API or ISAM functions to manage accounts, roles, and permissions.
Question: Why are the SQL dictionary privileges separate from the Server dictionaries?
Answer: The SQL dictionary privileges apply at the database level and the Server dictionaries apply to the whole server; thus, they have different scopes. In addition, the Server dictionaries contain tables that normal users should never see; whereas, it is a common practice to make the SQL dictionaries visible to normal users so they can run SQL queries on them to find tables, indexes, and other database objects.
Question: The admin account can already access the System tables, so why have separate permissions for reading and managing them?
Answer: Because no one should use the admin account day to day. Best practice is to reserve it for special recovery tasks. It has unrestricted power, and no other account can reset its password. Give it a very strong password and store that password in a highly protected password manager. Give each user their own account that no one else uses. The system can then track each account’s activity, which helps you spot malicious attackers. If a user needs to read or manage the SQL dictionary tables, assign their account to a role with the specific permissions for that task.
Question: Why does the FairCom server provide the readServerDictionaries privilege?
Answer: This privilege gives the user the authority to help troubleshoot issues with the Server dictionaries as directed by FairCom support.
Question: Why does the FairCom server provide the manageServerDictionaries privilege?
Answer: This privilege gives the user the authority to help fix issues with the Server dictionaries as directed by FairCom support.
Question: Why are the SQL dictionary privileges separate from the Server dictionaries?
Answer: The SQL dictionary privileges apply at the database level and the Server dictionaries apply to the whole server; thus, they have different scopes. In addition, the Server dictionaries contain tables that normal users should never see; whereas, it is a common practice to make the SQL dictionaries visible to normal users so they can run SQL queries on them to find tables, indexes, and other database objects.